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STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR PROSECUTORIAL USE
OF RACE EVIDENCE DURING TRIAL
Peter Chung*
This Note argues that unfettered use of cultural evidence by prosecutors creates the
same problems as would the use of evidence of race to show propensity of the ac-
cused to act. Using Wisconsin v. Chu as a case study, the author demonstrates
that cultural evidence, just as any other evidence to show propensity to act, must
rest upon the proper evidentiary foundation and that prosecutors must be sharply
constrained in their use of cultural evidence.
On January 4, 1998, a fire occurred in a drycleaners store owned
by So Man Chu and his wife Sun Hee Chu. During an investigation
of the fire, authorities discovered the Chu family was in financial
straits and began to suspect the fire was intentionally set to make
an insurance claim. Investigators arrested the proprietor's son,
Dale Chu, and charged him with arson. During the trial, the
prosecution made several references to Chu's Korean background
in an attempt to establish he acted in accordance to a cultural
stereotype of filial duty.1 Chu was convicted of arson with intent to
defraud an insurer. He appealed his conviction on several grounds,
including the prosecutor's repeated references to Korean culture.
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals upheld his conviction. Subsequent
appeals to the Wisconsin Supreme Court and the United States
Supreme Court were unsuccessful.
Wisconsin v. Chu' is a case illustrative of the problems a court
invites when admitting cultural evidence offered by prosecutors in
criminal trials. This Note will use Chu to analyze the merits of
cultural evidence and whether it should be admissible in criminal
trials when presented by prosecutors. Before proceeding further, a
definition of cultural evidence is necessary to clearly demarcate the
boundaries of this discussion. This Note defines cultural evidence
as a stereotype offered as fact during trial. Regardless of whether
such characterizations are actual reflections of a recognized
cultural practice, this Note considers all types of prosecutorial
references to racial stereotypes offered as cultural evidence. In
most cases, since cultural evidence is based on gross
generalizations, it cannot be empirically verified. When a court
* B.A. 1999, University of California, Berkley; J.D. 2003, University of Michigan Law
School. Thanks to Frank H. Wu for his insight and assistance.
I. Wisconsin v. Chu, 643 N.W.2d 878 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002).
2. Id.
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admits cultural evidence, a jury is encouraged to consider the
stereotype during deliberations. Thus, in these situations, it is
irrelevant whether the stereotype is true.
This Note will argue that prosecutorial presentation of racial or
cultural characterizations as evidence is a violation of due process
and its use amounts to a constitutional error that should be re-
viewed under the constitutional error test articulated in Chapman v.
California. Part I will distinguish how prosecutorial use of cultural
evidence is different from defendant use. Part II will use Chu as a
case study to examine how prosecutors may misuse cultural evi-
dence. Part III will analyze why race characterization requires a
heightened standard of review on appeal. Part IV will explore the
rare circumstances where cultural evidence should be admissible
when presented by the prosecution. Part V will conclude the Note
with a summary of the major points in favor of reforming the judi-
ciary's method of dealing with prosecutorial use of cultural
evidence.
PART I-DIFFERENCEs BETWEEN DEFENDANT USE AND
PROSECUTORIAL USE OF CULTURAL EVIDENCE
The majority of cases and legal scholarship involving the use of
cultural evidence deal with instances in which defendants show
how their actions were committed in accordance with a recognized
cultural practice to negate the criminal element of mens rea.4 Used
primarily by immigrants, arguments that the defendant acted in a
way he understands society normally desires serve to disprove the
specific intent necessary to convict an individual of a crime.5 This
3. 386 U.S. 18, 22-24 (1967).
4. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(1) (2001) ("Except as provided in Section 2.05, a per-
son is not guilty of an offense unless he acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently,
as the law may require, with respect to each material element of the offense.").
5. See Let Volpp, (Mis)identifying Culture: Asian Women and the "Cultural Defense", 17
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 57 (1994) (analyzing how cultural defenses affect Asian women and the
role of cultural relativism in criminal trials). See also People v. Moua, No. 315972-0 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Fresno County Feb. 7, 1985). Moua, a Hmong defendant, faced kidnapping and
rape charges. Not only did the defendant admit planning and executing the attack, he con-
fessed he was aware that the victim was struggling against his actions. The defendant used
his cultural background as an explanation of his behavior. Under the Hmong custom of
"marriage by capture", a man abducts a woman (whose interest is irrelevant) without her
consent to signal that he wants to marry her. If the woman does not protest, she is consid-
ered unchaste; if the man gives up, he is seen as weak. After intercourse, their parents work
out the marriage arrangements. During pre-trial negotiations, the defense presented the
judge with a twenty-two page pamphlet about Hmong marriage rituals. The pamphlet con-
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goes beyond a similar situation where a perpetrator commits a
crime because he is ignorant of applicable laws. Instead, cultural
defenses imply that the defendant acted appropriately in a particu-
lar situation. When employing a cultural defense, the defendant is
admitting to have committed the act charged. Thus, the prosecu-
tion can always use cultural evidence against defendants as
evidence of motive, plan, or pre-meditation.
Although there are several examples of criminal defendants pre-
senting a cultural defense, there is a dearth of cases where
prosecutors have used cultural evidence to implicate criminal con-
duct. This raises additional concerns not present when the
defendant raises such issues. There are significant differences be-
tween prosecutorial use of cultural evidence and its use by the
criminally accused. One major difference is the Fifth Amendment's
requirement that the state provide due process before taking away
an individual's liberty.6 In a criminal trial the prosecution is consti-
tutionally bound to provide a fair trial to the defendant. Although
American jurisprudence historically has not been unequivocally
clear on what a fair trial entails, the basic idea of an accused's right
to a fair trial is one of the traditional harbingers of American law.
A defendant's offer of cultural evidence is only probative if the
defendant can show that cultural norms dictated that he act in the
supposedly unlawful manner. By demonstrating that he acted ap
propriately given the set of circumstances that gave rise to his act in
question, a defendant can negate the criminal intent necessary to
be convicted. There are two ways to achieve this objective.
tained only a superficial description of a few types of marriage practices and cited one refer-
ence to "marriage by capture". However, the prosecution did not rebut the claims made in
the brochure and Moua pled guilty to one misdemeanor count of false imprisonment and
sentenced him to 120 days in jail and a $1,000 fine.
6. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
7. "'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence." FED. R. Evm. 401.
If cultural evidence can be shown to apply to a criminal defendant, it becomes relevant
because it helps fact finders know whether the defendant is more likely than not to have
committed the charged crime. Otherwise, the introduction of racial stereotypes in a case
that do not shed light on whether a defendant committed a crime only allows the introduc-
tion of possible juror bias into the jury's decision. Although there is a theoretical probability
that a racial stereotype could change the chances that an accused perpetrated a crime, Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 403 bars the introduction of such a stereotype: "Although relevant,
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EvID.
403.
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A. First Method
The first method is to demonstrate the validity of the cultural
evidence presented. By doing so, the defendant would be offering
circumstantial evidence that he acted within the customary proto-
col for a given set of circumstances. Since defendants who present
cultural evidence are typically immigrants still guided by the cus-
toms of their homelands, defendant offerings of cultural evidence
usually involve recognized cultural traits.a Testimony by anthro-
pologists and admission of academic research as evidence are
examples of ways the validity of cultural traits can be proven. There
is little danger that defendants will corrupt trial proceedings with
bald assertions that their acts were the result of following imagi-
nary societal customs. When an individual is charged with a violent
crime, explaining allegedly criminal conduct by only offering
stereotypical generalizations is unlikely to be credible to jurors.
Such excuses are similar to baseless, uncorroborated alibis in ju-
rors' eyes. Without any support to show how a defendant's cultural
background influenced his actions, explanations that criminal ac-
tions were done without criminal intent do not give any reason for
jurors to exculpate defendants.
B. Second Method
If a defendant cannot show that he acted within the societal
rules of another culture, he can alternatively attempt to show that
he sincerely believed that he acted within a culture's beliefs. The
success of this second type of use by defendants of cultural evi-
dence is dependent on whether a mistaken belief that a cultural
practice exists can criminalize intent.9 Since a defendant's earnest
8. See Gina Piccalo, Attorneys to Cite Similar Incident in Drowning Case Defense, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 17, 2000, at BlI. Fumkio Kimura was ajapanese immigrant who discovered her
husband was committing adultery. As a result, she attempted to commit "oyaku-shinju," a
Japanese custom of parent-suicide. She drowned her 4 year old son and baby daughter in
the waters of Santa Monica, California before being rescued from her own attempt at
drowning. Kimura was charged with two counts of first-degree murder but eventually
pleaded no contest to voluntary manslaughter. She received a sentence of one year in jail
with five years of probation.
9. This second method of negating mens rea with cultural evidence parallels "mistake
of fact" defenses. A "mistake of fact" defense is based on the premise that a defendant's
inaccurate understanding of the factual circumstances surrounding the alleged crime is
sufficient to prevent the establishment of a material element to the offense.
[VOL. 38:1
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belief that a cultural trait exists could absolve him of criminal in-
tent, establishing that the defendant mistakenly believed the
cultural trait exists could be probative.
The fact that cultural evidence presented by the defendant does
not have to be an accurate depiction of a culture significantly dif-
ferentiates it from prosecutorial uses of cultural evidence.
Defendants do not have to prove their innocence, whereas prose-
cutors must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant is guilty as charged. Accordingly, courts must restrict
prosecutorial cultural evidence to instances where admission of
evidence regarding verifiable cultural traits is probative to estab-
lishing one of the material elements of the crime. Otherwise,
courts jeopardize an individual's liberty on the basis of uncon-
firmed stereotypes. Although prosecutors have the greater burden
in winning a criminal case, defendants bear greater risk. At a cur-
sory glance, the asymmetrical criteria for allowing cultural
evidence may seem unfair, but the judicial system is created with
procedural safeguards for the accused to lessen the chance of a
court convicting an innocent person, even if such safeguards allow
a guilty party to go free. ° Few jurists are unfamiliar with the phrase,
"the law holds that it is better that ten guilty persons escape than
that one innocent suffer."" Courts must understand how the role
of cultural evidence in a trial changes depending on which party is
offering it as evidence.
PART II-How PROSECUTORS CAN MISUSE
CULTURAL EVIDENCE-Wisconsin v. Chu
At this point it is important to clarify the distinction between
prosecutorial misconduct and the type of cultural evidence focused
on in this essay. Misconduct occurs when a prosecutor merely
emotionally appeals to juror prejudice. 12 This Note's definition of
10. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (protection against illegal search and seizure); U.S.
CONST. amend. V (protection against double jeopardy and self-incrimination ); U.S. CONST.
amend. VI (right to effective assistance of counsel).
11. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *358.
12. See Smith v. Farley, 873 E Supp. 1199, 1213 (N.D. Ind. 1994) (holding that prosecu-
tor's remarks in closing argument that black defendant had to play "Superfly" and shoot
victim while he was lying on sidewalk and that black winess was "shucking and jiving on the
stand," were improper, but that the remarks did not interfere with impartiality of jurors;
comments were limited in scope and evidence of defendant's guilt was overwhelming);
Rosenthal v. U.S., 45 F.2d 1000, 1003 (8th Cir. 1930) (in closing argument, prosecutor called
FALL 2004]
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cultural evidence does not encompass instances of prosecutorial
misconduct. The strength of cultural evidence comes from
assertions of fact. 3 When prosecutors accuse individuals of acting
in accordance with a cultural trait, the accusations are based on
stereotypes dressed up as cultural facts. Hence, courts should be
cautious of whether proposed cultural evidence shifts a jury's
attention away from evidentiary analysis to emotion.' 4 In contrast,
emotional appeals are inflammatory statements made to arouse the
biases of jurors. Examples of prosecutorial misconduct includes
improper arguments offering a personal opinion regarding a
witness's credibility or guilt, diverting the jury's attention from
deciding a case on the evidence, and arguments made to inflame
or appeal to prejudice. In a dissenting opinion in United States v.
Antonelli Fireworks Co., Judge Jerome N. Frank articulated why
prosecutorial appeals to juror prejudice are disfavored.15 He noted
if a prosecutor is allowed to "inflame the jurors by ... arousing
their deepest prejudices, the jury may become in his hands a lethal
weapon directed against the defendants who may be innocent. He
should not be permitted to summon that thirteenth juror,
prejudice.' 6 Typically, when prosecutors make such appeals to
juror prejudice, they do so during closing arguments.
17
Although blatant appeals to juror prejudice are troublesome to
the judicial process, they are easy to identify and can be handled
the jury's attention to the fact that Jewish defendant rented large warehouse space appar-
ently for nothing and stated "I never knew of ajew before that would surrender a piece of a
warehouse twelve or fourteen feet wide and forty feet long for nothing."). Prosecutorial
attempts to inflame jurors' emotions are not solely focused on defendants' racial back-
ground but also include efforts to identify with the jurors. See Kelly v. Stone, 514 F.2d 18, 19
(9th Cir. 1975) (improper comments and inflammatory statements made by prosecuting
attorney such as "maybe the next time it won't be a little black girl from the other side of the
tracks; maybe it will be somebody that you know" denied black defendant a fair trial on rape
charges).
13. There is a wide spectrum of possible prosecutorial uses of race between outright
inflammatory appeal to racial bias and reasoned use of racial characterization. See
McFarland v. Smith, 611 F.2d 414 (2nd Cir. 1979) (during closing arguments prosecutor
insinuated that the testimony of an officer was credible because officer was the same race as
defendant).
14. See Schurman v. Leonardo, 768 F. Supp. 993 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that a sug-
gestion of racial motivation for a crime is allowable if it has an evidentiary basis and does not
refocus case emphasis from evidence to emotion).
15. 155 F.2d 631, 659 (1946). For a discussion of emotional appeals to juror preju-
dices, see generally RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW (1998).
16. 155 F.2d at 659.
17. See Miller v. North Carolina, 583 F.2d 701, 707-08 (4th Cir. 1978) (in his summa-
tion, prosecutor suggested that a defense based on consent in the trial of three black men
for first-degree rape of a white woman was inherently untenable because no white woman
would ever consent to having sexual relations with blacks).
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accordingly. This Note addresses cultural evidence of the type pre-
sented in a rational manner for acceptance by jurors' minds rather
than their hearts. It is more akin to junk science than prosecutorial
misconduct.
A. Wisconsin v. Dale H. Chu
Dale Chu was a 17 year old Korean son to parents who owned
"So's Dry Cleaning" in Appleton, Wisconsin.'8 On January 4, 1998,
a fire consumed the dry cleaning establishment, one of a few that
his parents owned.' He was charged with arson and intent to de-
fraud an insurer when investigators discovered evidence suggesting
a fire in his parents' store was set intentionally to make a fraudu-
lent insurance claim. 20 He was arrested under the belief that his
father ordered him to set the fire. In the Chu case, the prosecutor
presented testimonial evidence that as a Korean son, Dale Chu was
bound to obey his father's wishes even if those wishes meant com-
mitting a crime."' The prosecutors framed the racial
characterization with an opening statement that foreshadowed the
prosecution's intention to present cultural evidence and a closing
argument that reiterated the Korean filial stereotype. The prose-
cution used Dale Chu's Korean background to establish a motive
18. Brief for Respondent at 2-3, Wisconsin v. Chu, 643 N.W.2d 878 (Wis. Ct. App.
2002) (No. 01-1934-CR).
19. Wisconsin v. Chu, 643 N.W.2d 878, 880 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002).
20. Id. at 881. Neighbors to the dry cleaning store stated they saw an Asian male leave
the store approximately thirty minutes before when the fire was reported. There were no
signs of forced entry to the building and a window was left open, presumably to allow air
flow to sustain the fire. The Deputy Fire Chief for the City of Appleton testified as an expert
that he believed the fire was intentionally set. An independent fire investigator for the state
concurred with his opinion. Police investigators found that So Man Chu, Dale's father, was
in significant financial straits in 1997. In addition, So Man Chu increased his insurance pol-
icy an additional $80,000 two days prior to the blaze. When So Man Chu filed an insurance
claim for losses stemming from the fire, he claimed $499,030 in losses. However, the value of
several of the items that he claimed were lost in the fire was overstated, while other items
simply did not seem to have even existed.
21. Id. at 883.
22. In his opening statement, the prosecutor declared, "The evidence will show in fact
as part of family setup, and more particularly, because of his Korean culture, [Dale Chu] was
very devoted and loyal to his father." Record at 72-77, Chu, (No. 01-1934-CR. In his closing
argument, the prosecutor announced, "Dale Chu was-as a part of his life experiences, as
part of his test of loyalty-was faced with the biggest test of loyalty of his life, loyalty on be-
half of his dad.... And he carries out that mission ... to get out of that tremendous bond."
Record at 75-152, 153.
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for setting the fire. 3 According to the prosecutor, Dale Chu was
particularly loyal and faithful to his father because of his family en-
vironment and Korean heritage.24 The testimonial evidence in the
case came from Joanne Weiss. She portrayed herself as a "surrogate
mother"2 5 to Dale Chu and owned a house where he lived during
the summer of 1999.26 She testified:
I know that Dale would have to get something out of it, but
his dad is the one that should be sitting in that chair. In my
eyes, his dad is the one that is responsible. Dale was a 16-year
old kid and in his culture and in Dale's beliefs, you just don't
talk back to your parents, you don't-you do what your par-
ents ask you to do.27
Upon conviction, Dale Chu appealed on several grounds includ-
ing the prosecution's references to his racial background. In
upholding his conviction, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals inter-
preted the 7th Circuit case of Aliwoli v. CarteW' to allow states the
use of race to suggest motive. The Court of Appeals further found
the prosecutorial references to Dale's racial and cultural back-
ground allowable because they were not attempts to inflame juror
prejudice. Since the prosecutorial statements regarding race and
culture were based on cultural evidence, the Court of Appeals con-
sidered any such reference during arguments to be a preview or
summation of trial evidence.2 9
B. Flaws in the Chu Court's Reasoning
There are two major flaws in the way the Court of Appeals of Wis-
consin handled the state's use of cultural evidence. First, the
prosecutor did not directly tie Dale Chu to fit within the racial
stereotype of Korean sons being culturally compelled to follow their
father's commands. Second, the court failed to scrutinize whether
the cultural evidence should be admitted into evidence. The basis
23. Chu, 643 N.W.2d at 882.
24. Id. at 883.
25. Brief for Appellant at 9, Wisconsin v. Chu, 643 N.W.2d 878 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002)
(No. 01-1934-CR).
26. Chu, 643 N.W.2d at 882.
27. Id. at 883.
28. 225 F.3d 826 (7th Cir. 2000).
29. Chu, 643 N.W.2d at 884.
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for this failure was the court's inability to understand how cultural
evidence affects the trial process. These two problems are indicative
of the problems a court faces when deciding whether to admit
prosecutorial cultural evidence.
The prosecution portrayed Dale Chu as a dutiful son bound by
Korean custom to follow his father's wishes. In reality, Dale Chu was
often very disobedient to his father and did not fit the mold of a tra-
ditional Korean son. They had a strained relationship for a sustained
period of time. When Dale ran away from home when he was 15
years old, his father did not report his disappearance to the police.30
His father did not even know that Dale, who was still a teenager at
the time, had an illegitimate child until five months after the child
had been born.3 ' These are not the traits of a traditional, pious Ko-
rean son. Perhaps Dale did not fit with the Korean son stereotype
because he was not an immigrant himself. 3  Dale was born and
raised in America, a different environment from the societal norms
of Korea.33 Whatever the reasons may be, Dale did not neatly fit
within the prosecutor's depiction of obedient Korean sons. The
prosecutor did not directly show how cultural evidence was relevant
to Dale Chu's circumstances. By not directly connecting Dale to the
stereotype, the prosecutor misled the jury with unqualified opinions
dressed as anthropological fact and established motive through the
use of a racial stereotype.
The trial court allowed the prosecutor's offer of cultural evidence
without inquiring into its validity. The prosecutor's opening and
closing arguments included references to the state's use of cultural
evidence during trial, but defense counsel did not object to their
inclusion. As a result, no scrutiny was placed on the prosecutorial
arguments until the appeal was filed. With regard to the actual pres-
entation of cultural evidence, the trial court's acceptance of Joanne
Weiss's testimony explaining the cultural nuances behind Korean
family relationships was done in the absence of any qualification of
30. Brief for Appellant at 24, Chu, (No. 01-1934-CR).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 23, 24. In the post-conviction appeal, Dale Chu secured the services of Dr.
Yueh-Ting Lee, an associate professor of psychology at Minnesota State University and an
expert on ethnic stereotypes. He explained the prosecutorial view of Korean sons was based
on outdated and inaccurate views of Asian Americans. Dr. Lee cited the findings of sociolo-
gist Betty Lee Sung to point out that although Chinese parents wanted their children to
follow Chinese cultural norms, American born Chinese children grew up with American
values and were relatively more disobedient and disloyal to their parents. He also pointed to
a 1986 study by Strom, Daniels & Parks that shows Korean American parents tended to raise
their children to be more independent and encourage them to voice their own opinions.
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Joanne Weiss as an expert in Korean culture. If Weiss had based her
testimony on personal observations of the Chu household, then she
could have offered admissible testimony that So Man Chu was an
overbearing father or that Dale may have possessed an unquestiona-
bly submissive nature with respect to his parents' wishes. Instead, by
couching her testimony as a generalization of Korean culture, she
made a statement that contains no probative value unless the fact
finder assumes that most Koreans accurately fit within the stereo-
type. Additionally, since Weiss was not qualified as an expert on
Korean culture, there is no basis for believing that her claims regard-
ing Korean culture are credible. Aside from Weiss, the state did not
offer the testimony of any experts on Korean culture. 4
The reason why the trial court and appellate court did not con-
sider the use of cultural evidence to be improper is that the courts
confused cultural evidence with prosecutorial misconduct. Cultural
evidence is not synonymous with prosecutorial misconduct stem-
ming from use of racial stereotypes. For instance, it would not be
misconduct for a prosecutor to offer cultural evidence in good faith
for a recognized purpose. Sincere attempts by counsel to introduce
what is presumed to be valid evidence cannot be considered an act
of misconduct because there is no intent to inflame jurors' biases,
subvert the legal process, or do anything but try a defendant. How-
ever, even though the offer of evidence may not be an act of
misconduct, in most cases the cultural evidence will be highly preju-
dicial to a defendant and should not be admitted. Instead of
examining the possible effects of the cultural evidence on the jury
and the trial process, both courts focused on whether the prosecutor
had tried to inflame jurors' biases. 35 The courts did not understand
the prejudicial nature of cultural evidence and endorsed its good
faith use.36 Consequently, the courts looked to the intentions of the
prosecutor and neglected to inspect the nature of the offered evi-
dence itself.
The prosecutor and the courts in Chu mistakenly relied on the
standards set in Aliwoli for determining whether the use of cultural
34. Id. at 33.
35. See Wisconsin v. Chu, 643 N.W.2d 878, 884 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002) ("Similarly, we do
not view the prosecutor's statements as an attempt to arouse jury prejudice toward Koreans.
Rather, the statements were an attempt to preview and summarize evidence demonstrating
that Chu had a motive for committing the arson: his personal belief, based on his upbring-
ing and culture, that he should remain loyal to his family."). See also Brief for Respondent at
21, 22, Chu, (No. 01-1934-CR) for the argument that the statement was not improper racial
stereotyping because it was merely the prosecutor's explanation of why Chu committed the
arson, not an attempt to arouse anyjury prejudice against Koreans.
36. Chu, 643 N.W.2d at 884.
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evidence against Dale should have been admitted. Aliwoli is a case
dealing with prosecutorial misconduct and attempts to arouse juror
prejudice. Jamaljah Aliwoli was convicted on three counts of at-
tempting to murder three Chicago police officers in the first
degree.37 On appeal, Aliwoli contended that the state violated his
due process rights by attempting to "establish that Aliwoli's member-
ship in the black Muslim faith gave him a motive to shoot the three
police officers." 8 In reviewing his appeal, the 7th Circuit determined
that the state's references39 to Aliwoli's religious beliefs as a black
Muslim were appropriate because the prosecutor was trying to estab-
lish motive and not deliberately appeal to jurors' emotions. ° The
Aliwoli court tried to determine whether statements "so infected the
trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of
due process. 01
Aliwoli set a sound standard42 for reviewing prosecutorial at-
tempts at inflaming jurors' passions and biases, but that standard
does not lend itself successfully when evaluating cultural evidence.
Cultural evidence does not fit within the Aliwoli framework because
37. Aliwoli v. Carter, 225 E3d 826, 828 (7th Cir. 2000).
38. Id. at 830.
39. Id. at 831:
For example, the State cross-examined two of Aliwoli's expert witnesses by asking
whether Aliwoli's black Muslim faith encompassed an anti-authority stance. The
prosecutor also asked whether black Muslims have a negative view of the police and
inquired about a black Muslim newspaper during the late 1960's and early 197
0 's that
referred to police officers as "pigs" and white people as "white devils." The prosecutor
queried whether one expert was familiar with a 1984 article in American Psychologist
Publication that suggested that many African-Americans consider white people as po-
tential enemies. Finally, the prosecutor also asked one expert about a statement in
her psychosocial history of Aliwoli where she wrote, "although a Muslim, he did not
seem to be excessively hostile towards whites."
40. Id.:
It is apparent from the context of the prosecutor's questions that the references to
Aliwoli's membership in the black Muslim faith were only meant to show that Aliwoli
had a motive for shooting the police officers. In other words, the questions were
clearly intended to rebut Aliwoli's insanity defense. Because the questions about Ali-
woli's beliefs as a black Muslim focused solely on his state of mind and potential
motive for the shootings, they were not improper. Although the questions mentioned
Aliwoli's race and religion, none of them can be reasonably viewed as attempting to
arouse jury prejudice towards blacks or Muslims. In short, there is no evidence that
these comments were intended to play upon the prejudices of the jury.
41. Id. at 829 (quoting Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986)).
42. Id. at 831. "As a general rule, a racial remark is improper if it is "intentionally in-
jected into volatile proceedings where the prosecutor had targeted the defendant's ethnic
origin for emphasis in an attempt to appeal to the jury's prejudices." (citing United States v.
Hernandez, 865 F.2d 925, 928 (7th Cir. 1989)).
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
it does not necessarily involve misconduct or the intentional
arousal of juror prejudice. The most pressing danger cultural evi-
dence poses results from unemotional offers of evidence that
appear to be factually based. Cultural evidence exists when stereo-
types are presented as rational thoughts and objective theories.
There are no emotional pleas or passionate appeals involved. An-
other distinction between Aliwoli and Chu that prevents their
comparison is that the cultural evidence in Aliwoli was based on
religious beliefs. As this Note will discuss later in Part IV, cultural
evidence based on religious beliefs is different from cultural evi-
dence based on racial stereotypes and does not deprive individuals
of due process.
PART Ill-WHY PROSECUTORIAL USE OF CULTURAL
EVIDENCE REQUIRES HEIGHTENED REVIEW
In addition to the differences in the nature of cultural evidence
and prosecutorial misconduct involving racial stereotypes discussed
in Part I, there are differences in the way both methods of charac-
terization affect the trial process. The use of cultural evidence
should be avoided in most cases and requires the highest level of
judicial scrutiny when offered for admission because it circumvents
the 5th Amendment's guarantee of due process by having two ma-
jor negative consequences on the trial process. First, it affects the
accused by forcing defendants to confront evidence that they can-
not effectively contest. Secondly, cultural evidence affects the trial
process itself because it allows jurors to exercise their biases against
defendants of different backgrounds. In addition, prosecutorial
cultural evidence warrants special attention from courts because it
does not fall neatly within the current system of evidentiary rules.
The following sections will lay out the effects of prosecutorial cul-
tural evidence on defendants and jurors and investigate the
effectiveness of current evidentiary schemes that could be used to
determine when such evidence should be admitted.
43. Id. at 830-831.
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A. Effect on Criminally Accused
The use of cultural evidence against criminal defendants denies
them a fair trial under the Fifth Amendment because racial stereo-
types cannot be directly refuted and attempts to do so may compel a
defendant to waive his right to self-incrimination." When a court
accepts testimony regarding a specific cultural practice or racial
stereotype, defendants face the formidable task of discrediting the
generalization. How does one go about rebutting a stereotype? De-
fendants will always only have limited success during cross
examination of witnesses presenting cultural evidence. Even if wit-
nesses admit their testimonies are based on generalizations of an
identifiable group as a whole, such admissions bolster the prosecu-
tion's case. These admissions allow prosecutors to reiterate that
members of a group, with which a defendant is inherently associ-
ated, would typically act in conformity with the characterization.
One of the central weaknesses of cultural evidence is that it cannot
be empirically proven. Witnesses providing cultural evidence typi-
cally do so by giving qualitative assessments.Y However, what is a
weakness in the eyes of defense attorneys is a strength in the minds
of prosecutors because although cultural evidence cannot be proven
true, it also cannot be proven wrong. With the limited prospect of
discrediting cultural evidence, defendants may feel compelled to
testify. In criminal cases, defendants are not required to testify under
the Fifth Amendment's guarantee against self-incrimination. 4 Once
a court accepts a racial generalization as the basis for a theoretical
motive, leaving the assertion unchallenged will be damaging to a
defendant. Without a realistic avenue of disproving prosecutorial
44. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("no person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself."); see also South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 563 (1983)
("the Court has long recognized that the Fifth Amendment prevents the State from forcing
the choice of this "cruel trilemma" on the defendant").
45. Since cultural evidence is difficult to verify empirically, one may wonder why
prosecutorial use should be subject to more scrutiny than defendant use. When prosecutors
use cultural evidence, they are not directly making a claim that the defendant fits a stereo-
type; they are trying to get jurors to infer it. When defendants use cultural evidence, it
parallels the testimony of an individual attesting to their private thoughts. The tie between
the cultural stereotype and the defendant is made directly by the defendant. It is no differ-
ent than a defendant making an unverifiable statement about their thoughts or feelings.
The jury can take it or reject it as they please based on the credibility of the defendant.
46. Qualitative statements include claims such as the following: Asians are submissive,
blacks are athletic, etc. On the other hand, quantitative statements would be verifiable fac-
tual statements based on empirical research or statistics.
47. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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evidence based on mere stereotypes, defendants are forced to
make a difficult decision. They must choose between leaving
prosecutorial cultural evidence uncontested in front of the fact-
finder or testifying that the stereotype does not truthfully depict
the defendant's culture. The most effective way to combat a stereo-
type's effectiveness is for a defendant to testify how he does not fit
within it. If the defendant decides to testify, he opens himself up to
questioning regarding other matters outside the scope of cultural
evidence. In effect, the non-existence of effective methods for re-
futing prosecutorial cultural evidence may compel the defendant
to testify.
B. Propensity Evidence Rules
The allowance of cultural evidence essentially permits the trying
of a defendant on the actions of others. The use of cultural evi-
dence to associate a defendant with the behaviors of others
parallels the use of propensity evidence in that both are offered to
suggest the defendant acted in accordance with an established
trait. The Federal Rules of Evidence states, "[e]vidence of a per-
son's character or a trait of his character is not admissible for the
purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a par-
ticular occasion" except when character itself is a "pertinent"
issue. This means courts generally disallow evidence of one's
reputation that is introduced to prove the defendant acted in a
particular way on a specific date.4 9 For instance, if a man was known
as the local bully, evidence that he had a reputation for being a
bully would not be allowed as evidence to suggest that he assaulted
someone on a particular date. Only when a defendant takes the
48. Fed. R. Evid. 404(a).
49. State courts have evidence codes similar to the rules for character evidence outlined
in the Federal Rules of Evidence. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 904.04(1) (2000) ("Evidence of a per-
son's character or a trait of a person's character is not admissible for the purpose of proving
that the person acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion"); CAL. EViD. CODE
§ 1101 (West 2004) ("(a) Except as provided in this section and in Sections 1102, 1103, 1108,
and 1109, evidence of a person's character or a trait of his or her character (whether in the
form of an opinion, evidence of reputation, or evidence of specific instances of his or her con-
duct) is inadmissible when offered to prove his or her conduct on a specified occasion.");
MICH. CoMp. LAws § 404(a) (2004) ("Evidence of a person's character or a trait of charac-
ter is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a
particular occasion"). See also FED. R. EvID. 404(a) advisory committee's note ("The criminal
rule is so deeply imbedded in our jurisprudence as to assume almost constitutional propor-
tions and to override doubts of the basic relevancy of the evidence.").
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initiative to inject character into a trial may the state offer charac-
ter evidence in rebuttal to prove conduct.
50
The basis for these evidentiary restrictions is steeped "more in
history and experience than in logic" but the "underlying justifica-
tion" is to prevent the admission of relatively non-probative
evidence that is heavy with prejudice." There may be some value to
evidence that suggests a defendant had a violent reputation, but
the criminal justice system recognizes that rumors should not be
used for the purpose of proving a specific act. Whether someone's
reputation reveals if that person is more likely to have committed a
crime is questionable. Courts value relevance because relevant evi-
dence allows fact finders to resolve the factual discrepancies that
parties disagree upon in trial.52 Reputation evidence may be the
result of nothing more than rumors and lies, so it does not provide
a factual basis for proving that a defendant has committed a crime.
Even if a defendant earned his reputation for traits such as vio-
lence or anger, the accuracy of proposed character evidence does
not remove the great risk of prejudice to the defendant that occurs
when prosecutors suggest that he acted in conformity with the
characterization on a particular occasion. Such prejudice will al-
ways exist when reputation evidence is offered to prove that an
individual committed a crime because a reputation for having a
particular trait does not equate to having acted in accordance with
that trait at all times.
Although the relevance of character evidence is questionable,
the relevance of prosecutorial cultural evidence is even more du-
bious. Rather than involving an accused's reputation, it involves
the reputation of an entire group. Theoretically, if a prosecutor
was allowed to admit a defendant's reputation for violence, the
evidence would reveal at best that the defendant was known by his
community to have a violent nature. No matter how faulty reputa-
tion evidence is, it is an attempt to individually assess the
defendant's character. On the other hand, prosecutorial cultural
evidence is not an attempt to directly establish that the defendant
has been known in a community to possess a particular trait. In-
stead, it is an effort to indirectly suggest that reputation evidence
50. FED. R. EVID. 404(a) (1,2); see also McCoRMICI ON EVInENCE,(John W. Strong, ed.,
5th ed. 1999) (unless the defendant gives evidence of his good character, the prosecution
cannot put forth evidence of defendant's bad character).
51. FED. R. EvID. 404(a) advisory committee's note.
52. FED. R. EVD. 401 ("'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.").
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for an ethnic group is valid and that the defendant's inherent
membership in that group makes him possess a particular trait.
Most jurisdictions also have broad prohibitions against the
prosecution's introduction of prior specific acts to suggest that the
defendant has a propensity to commit crimes. Like reputation evi-
dence, the introduction of prior acts cannot be used to contend
that a defendant acted in conformity with those acts during the
incident in question. 53 However, there is a major exception to this
general rule. Evidence of prior bad acts may be admissible for
other purposes such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, prepa-
ration, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or
accident.5 4 As long as counsel declares that the purpose of intro-
ducing evidence of prior acts is for a different reason than
proposing that the defendant is guilty of acting in conformity with
those acts, it may be admissible.5
Skillful attorneys can use this exception to introduce otherwise
prohibited evidence.56 Prosecutors can enlarge this loophole by
inventing a valid reason for admitting evidence of prior acts. Since
the list of admissible purposes in the Federal Rules is not exhaus-
tive, prosecutors are only limited by their imaginations. Once a
jury hears evidence of prior bad acts, regardless of the justifications
for its admission into evidence, the defendant's chances for an ac-
quittal fall in the minds of jurors who associate past behavior with
the likelihood of being guilty.
If courts applied evidentiary rules similar to the Federal Rules of
Evidence to cultural evidence and treated it as character evidence,
the defendant would have to begin an inquiry into his cultural
background before the prosecution can delve into those matters.
Applying FRE 404(a) appears to rule out use of cultural evidence
by prosecutors. Alternatively, if evidence rules similar to FRE
404(b) applied and analogized the treatment of cultural evidence
to the process for admitting prior acts, prosecutors could easily jus-
tify the admission of cultural evidence as an attempt to show
53. FED. R. EVID. 404(b) ("Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible
to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith.").
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Philip R. Maltin & Michael D. Schwartz, Second Acts, The Expansive Reach of Evidence
Code Section 1101(B) Provides a Basis for Effective Strategies Before and During Tria4 27 L.A. LAW.
31, 32 (2004) ("The obvious impact of the evidence the section regulates should invite at-
torneys to use that section whenever possible. Inventive strategies using Section 1101 (b) may
lead to the introduction of otherwise prohibited evidence. Practitioners can utilize Section
1101 (b) in ways that expand its reach and enhance its influence before and during trial.").
57. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
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motive. The distinction between using prior acts to prove propen-
sity and using such evidence to show motive is slight. The
difference between propensity and motive is that motive involves
showing why an individual responded to a particular set of circum-
stances, whereas propensity is just a tendency to act in a particular
way. Motive is a specific showing of what caused someone to act.
Skilled attorneys would be able to blur the distinction to the point
where most cultural evidence could be admitted to show motive,
but used by the jury as propensity evidence.
The difficulty of treating prosecutorial use of cultural evidence
under the guidelines of FRE 404(b) is that cultural evidence does
not deal with the defendant's prior acts. If the proposed cultural
evidence is not an accurate statement of an existing cultural prac-
tice, it cannot logically be treated under evidentiary rules for prior
bad acts. Even if the proposed cultural evidence is a truthful ac-
count of a recognized cultural practice, admitting it into evidence
under FRE 404(b) would be an error because prosecutors cannot
directly tie the previous acts of others to the defendant.
Without heightened standards for admitting cultural evidence,
defendants may be convicted on evidence detailing the actions of
others. Cultural evidence is not an individualized showing of mo-
tive. Every member of a racial minority group is subject to having
an established motive if cultural evidence is readily admissible. For
Dale Chu, if the only reason the prosecutor thought he acted in
accordance to his father's wishes was because of his Korean back-
ground, the use of cultural evidence would be nothing more than
a masked use of propensity evidence. Cultural evidence is less pro-
bative than propensity evidence because Dale is being compared
with stereotypical actions of other Koreans, not with actions of his
own past. Thus, not only is cultural evidence highly prejudicial, it is
ripe for manipulation by attorneys who seek to admit the evidence
by masking it as an explanation for motive.
Although the strength of cultural evidence lies in the prosecu-
tion's suggestion to the jury that most people in the defendant's
common cultural group act in the same manner, it only is relevant
to the trial process if the jury assumes the defendant acts uniformly
with the group. The Federal Rules of Evidence standards govern-
ing character evidence should apply to when and how cultural
evidence should be allowed. Only when the defendant first intro-
duces his character during trial should the prosecution be able to
delve into anything resembling propensity evidence. If a defendant
makes the decision to make his beliefs and daily practices an issue
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during trial, he has not been coerced into taking the stand. Oth-
erwise, cultural evidence can present a 5th Amendment self-
incrimination problem even when offered for other reasons be-
sides propensity.5s
C. Effect on Jurors
Since witnesses relating cultural evidence only testify about the
existence of group stereotypes, such testimony is only probative if
jurors connect the supposed cultural behavior to defendants
through group affiliation. Jurors cannot ignore cultural evidence
because once a judge determines it is admissible, it automatically
gains credibility. Blatant racial stereotypes that would raise eye-
brows if uttered in most public forums become sociological
theories when presented in court. Under the guise of reasoned
deduction, cultural evidence repackages racial stereotypes and pre-
sents them as facts. Even enlightened jurors would have difficulty
rejecting racial stereotypes when they are presented as factual evi-
dence. Jurors have discretion to reject and accept the soundness of
evidence presented, but courts expect that jurors give considera-
tion to all admitted evidence.
Although the effects of cultural evidence are subtler than prose-
cutorial misconduct, it is subtlety that compounds the harmful
nature of cultural evidence because it makes the racial stereotypes
underlying cultural evidence difficult to recognize. When cultural
evidence is presented in a manner that is meant to appeal to ra-
tional thought, its effects on the jury are twofold. First, it allows
racially prejudiced jurors to exercise their biases without circum-
spection by the judge. When a judge allows the prosecutorial
admission of cultural evidence, it signals to the jury that they are
allowed to draw their own assumptions about racial and cultural
stereotypes when weighing the evidence against the accused. Sec-
ondly, when prosecutors use cultural evidence it encourages the
manifestation of hidden biases within jurors of which even the ju-
rors are not cognizant.59
58. See infra Part IV for when cultural evidence should be allowed and under what
guidelines it should be admissible.
59. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach
To Discrimination And Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN L. REV. 1161 (1995). Krieger
argues that cognitive biases shape people's point of view and cause people to classify things.
Krieger also notes that people may exaggerate differences based on perceived groupings
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In his book Negrophobia and Reasonable Racism, Jody David Armour
explains that there is a difference between prejudice and stereo-
types.6" Even when people are not prejudiced, ingrained stereotypes
can cause conflict with how they know they should act.6' Cultural
evidence allows these stereotypes to come to the forefront without
that conflict and in the absence of prejudice because jurors are fol-
lowing rational evidence the prosecutor presented. Rendering
cultural evidence inadmissible cuts off an avenue for people, who do
not want to be prejudiced, to express their hidden or conflicting
biases.
Appeals to racial bias are effective in trial because people harbor
hidden prejudices. A case that illustrates the effects of hidden
prejudices on a criminal defendant is the New York case of People v.
Goetz.62 Bernhard Goetz was a white male who was carrying a con-
cealed, unlicensed .38 caliber handgun on a subway train.3 Two
young black males approached him and said, "Give me five dol-
lars."6' He shot the two males and their two companions as they
tried to get away from him even though none of them displayed
any weapons. 65 When Goetz noticed one of the youths appeared
uninjured, he walked up to the young man and said, "' [Y] ou seem
to be all right, here's another,"' then fired his remaining bullet.6
This last bullet caused paralysis by cutting through the black male's
spinal cord.67 Goetz admitted to police, "'[I]f I had had more [bul-
lets], I would have shot them again, and again, and again.' " The
first grand jury to hear the case dismissed the count of attempted
murder.69 A second grand jury brought indictments for attempted
without motivation; this means the first type of pretext may be especially hard for someone
to prove discrimination because people may not know they have discriminatory biases exist-
ing in their brains. She proposes that cognitive mechanisms of all people distort information
automatically without people being aware of its occurrence. See also Mark Snyder, et al., So-
cial Perception and Interpersonal Behavior: On the Self-Fulfilling Nature of Social Stereotypes, 35 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 656 (1977) (arguing that once an individual internalizes
tacitly transmitted cultural stereotypes, he unconsciously interprets future experiences to be
consistent with the underlying stereotype, selectively assimilating facts that validate the
stereotype while disregarding those that do not).
60. JODY DAVID ARMOUR, NEGROPHOBIA AND REASONABLE RACISM, 121-126 (1997).
61. Id.
62. People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41 (N.Y. 1986).
63. Id. at 43.
64. Id.
65. Id. Two of the black males had screwdrivers hidden in their coats to break into
video game machine coin-boxes.
66. Id. at 44.
67. Subway Shooting Suspect Agrees to Return to N.Y., L.A. TiMES,Jan. 2, 1985, at A2.
68. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d at 44.
69. Id. at 44-45.
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murder after the Supreme Court, Criminal Term, allowed the
prosecution to resubmit the matter due to newly discovered evi-
dence °.7 During trial, Bernard Goetz claimed self-defense and was
acquitted of attempted murder charges. His self-defense claim was
based on his contention that it was reasonable for a person in his
situation to have acted in the same manner.
Legal observers have theorized over the role race played in the
case and whether a grand jury sympathized with a white male who
shot young black robbers on the subway.7 Race was never an ex-
plicit issue during the Goetz trial. Defense counsel subtly
manipulated juror prejudices in favor of his client. For instance,
the defense recreated the incident in the courtroom to show how
each victim was shot.
7"
The nominal purpose of the demonstration was to show the
way in which each bullet entered the body of each victim. The
defense's real purpose, however, was to re-create for the jury,
as dramatically as possible, the scene that Goetz encountered
when four young black passengers began to surround him.
70. Id. at 45.
71. See George . Fletcher, A Crime of Self-Defense: Bernard Goetz and the Law on
Trial, 206 (1988):
These verbal attacks signaled a perception of the four youths as representing some-
thing more than four individuals committing an act of aggression against a
defendant. That "something more" requires extrapolation from their characteristics
to the class of individuals for which they stand. There is no doubt that one of the
characteristics that figures in this implicit extrapolation is their blackness.
See also Stephen L. Carter, When Victims Happen to Be Black, 97 YALE L.J. 420, 425-426
(1988):
The public knew the skin colors of everyone involved. If one knows in advance that
black people tend to be transgressors and white people tend to be victims, it is fairly
simple to sort out who's who once the participants are identified by race. The short of
it is that the story of the subway car as perceived by Mr. Goetz's public-the choice of
transgressor, the choice of victim-might have been starkly different had Mr. Goetz
been black and the others white, and had Mr. Goetz cried "self-defense" while the
others insisted that when he pulled the gun, they had been minding their own busi-
ness. For in that event, a public with no real knowledge of the facts other than the
stories told by the participants and the skin colors of the shooter and his victims
would not have raced at once to Mr. Goetz's defense. But his victims happened to be
black, and the rush was on.
See also Bob Greene, N.Y Subway Attack Speaks for Nation, CHI. TRIB.,Jan. 8, 1985, sec. 5, at 1
("New York's police set up a telephone hotline so that citizens could provide tips about the
shooter's identity; instead, the phone line was flooded with citizens praising [Goetz], even
saying that he should run for mayor.").
72. Fletcher, supra note 71, at 207.
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For that reason [Goetz's attorney] asked the Guardian Angels
to send him four young black men to act as the props in the
demonstration. In came the four young black Guardian An-
gels, fit and muscular, dressed in T-shirts, to play the parts ofS73
the four victims in a courtroom mini-drama.
Whatever inferences the jury drew from the racial identities of
the defendant and victims were the result of the jurors' personal
stereotypes of young black male robbers and white targets of rob-
bery. At the end of the trial, jurors were free to use their racial
prejudices in determining whether Goetz as a white male acted jus-
tifiably to protect himself when approached by black males for $5.
People v. Goetz is an instructive case that illuminates not only how
juror prejudices can still affect the trial process in the absence of
blatant appeals to race bias, but also what the role of a trial judge
should be in limiting the possible effects of racial prejudice from
interfering with judicial proceedings. When the jurors in Goetz
were asked whether Goetz's actions were consistent with those of a
reasonable man in his situation, they were allowed to consider the
race of the defendant and those who had surrounded him on the
subway. Courts have the duty of defining the reasonableness
standard in a reasonable man test." Mere observation of what
constitutes popular thought and calling that reasonable is not
enough.75  In everyday life, people make judgments about
individuals based on group affiliation. Business organizations such
as insurance companies assign risk to individuals based on group
risk assessments, and lenders act the same way with respect to giving
loans.76  Making assumptions of individuals based on their
membership to particular groups is commonly used in everyday life
because it is cheaper and quicker than individualized consideration.
However, relative cost comparisons should not be the determining
factor in deciding whether to invest in making an individualized
73. Id. For other cases where attorneys use subtle references to race to bolster their
cases, see generally Brent v. White, 398 F.2d 503, 505 (5th Cir. 1968) (upholding rape convic-
tion by finding prosecutor's description of rape victims as "'white girls' revealed nothing
that jury could not itself observe when both victims testified"); Simpson v. Jones, 238 F.3d
399 (6th Cir. 2000) (finding no improper conduct when prosecutor referred to defendant as
"dark skinned one" to distinguish defendant from the other two defendants); Russell v.
Collins, 944 F.2d 202, 204 n.1 (5th Cir. 1991) (finding prosecutor's argument asking jury to
imagine fear of white victim when held captive by three black strangers an isolated reference
to the identity of the parties and not improper conduct).
74. ARMOUR, supra note 60, at 33.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 46.
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consideration. In some situations, the apportionment of risk
outweighs the cost-effective approach of using generalizations. In
the area of criminal prosecutions, the risk of misapplying a
stereotype to a criminal defendant is too significant. In deciding
whether a criminal case requires individualized consideration, the
use of generalizations is only efficient because the decision maker is
not at risk to bear the costs the criminal defendant faces if aS 71
generalization is misapplied. The cost of not using individualized
consideration is high if the generalization is wrong; even if the
generalization seems logical, it may not be reasonable when
balancing the potential costs to a defendant.78  Without
individualized consideration, a criminal defendant is denied due
process of law because the specifics of his case are ignored.79
Although a trial infected by racial prejudice violates due process
by influencing the jury both in instances of racial stereotyping by
jurors and prosecutorial use of cultural evidence, use of cultural
evidence is a violation that courts are better equipped to handle.
Unless prosecutors make overt appeals to racial bias, prejudiced
juror action is difficult to police. If states do not create the racial
characterizations that jurors apply to defendants, it will be difficult
for courts to even know racial bias was a significant factor in the
juror's decision.8 ° This rings particularly true when observations of
the races of the defendant and victim by jurors are the only impe-
tus for racial prejudice to factor into their decisions of guilt or
innocence. Jury deliberations are not readily open to scrutiny.
When jurors use racial biases on their own impetus to pervade
their decision-making process, states are often passive actors that
77. Id.
78. Id. at 47-48.
79. See id. at 71 (Armour suggests that the 14th Amendment's guarantee of equal pro-
tection may be infringed if states use race categories to try defendants differently. For
instance, a black male's trial experience will be different from that of a white male solely
because he is of a different race.).
80. See U.S. v. Santiago, 46 F.3d 885 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that references to ethnic
identity in prison murder case did not violate defendant's right to equal protection and that
using name of prison gang and relevant testimony referring to ethnic background of certain
prisoners was not an appeal to race bias); U.S. v. Kirvan, 997 F.2d 963 (1st Cir. 1993) (closing
argument that jury should consider whether defendant met eyewitness description of perpe-
trator as being Portuguese not an impermissible racial slur. Even if "Portuguese" served a
dual role the court would have found it not an impermissible racial slur because the courts
err on the side of harmless error.); Brent v. White, 276 F. Supp. 386 (E.D. La. 1967) (prose-
cutor's reference to victim of alleged rape as "a white girl" in trial of black defendant not
inflammatory even though jury was all white because when the victim took the stand it was
obvious she was "a white girl"); U.S. v. Perez, 144 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 1998) (prosecution's
referral to conversation in Spanish between government agent and defendants as "[t] hey do
a Spanish thing" was just a reference to the fact that the conversation was in Spanish.).
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cannot prevent jurors from exercising those prejudices. However,
in the instances of prosecutorial presentation of cultural evidence,
states are actively placing defendants into a category without verify-
ing if defendants actually fit within the group.1 When prosecutors
present cultural evidence, states are actively encouraging juries to
make incorrect assumptions of criminally accused. Overt actions by
prosecutors are easier to manage than covert thinking processes of
jurors. Presentation of cultural evidence is a step that precedes ju-
ror determination of guilt. Courts can limit the influence of juror
biases by preventing the admission of cultural evidence, or limiting
its use.
D. Standards for Reviewing Prejudicial Effects
of Cultural Evidence on Jurors
To determine what standard would apply upon appellate review
of a conviction tainted by prosecutorial use of cultural evidence,
the admission of cultural evidence first must be classified. There
are separate standards of review for constitutional errors and non-
constitutional errors. If cultural evidence is classified as a constitu-
tional error, the Chapman test would apply.8 2 When reviewing
constitutional errors that infect the trial process, appellate courts
usually apply the Chapman standard.83 In Chapman, the petitioners
were a couple who had been found guilty of robbery, kidnapping
and murder. 4 Both defendants chose not to testify during their
trial and the prosecutor commented during closing arguments that
their silence was indicative of their guilt.8 5 Before the California
Supreme Court heard the defendants' appeal, the United States
Supreme Court held in Griffin v. California that allowing the state
to comment on a defendant's exercise of silence during trial was
tantamount to putting a "penalty on the exercise of a person's
right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself, guaran-
teed by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
and made applicable to California and the other States by the
81. There may be conflicting stereotypes that exist for the same ethnic categories. For
example, an Asian defendant may either be presented as an individual who fits the profile of
a studious, docile Asian. On the other hand, the defendant could be shown to be a socially
deviant Asian gangster.
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Fourteenth Amendment."86 When the Chapman defendants' ap-
peal reached the California Supreme Court, the court admitted
that the defendants were denied their federal constitutional right
to remain silent."7 However, the court affirmed the convictions un-
der the California state constitution's harmless error clause
because the errors did not result in a miscarriage ofjustice.5 a
When the Chapman defendants appealed to the United States
Supreme Court, the Court granted certiorari to decide two issues.
"Where there is a violation of the rule of Griffin v. California, ...
(1) can the error be held to be harmless, and (2) if so, was the er-
ror harmless in this case?"8 9 The Court held "before a federal
constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able
to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt".90 In a subsequent case, the Supreme Court applied the
Chapman standard to mean whether a rational jury would have
found a defendant guilty without the inadmissible evidence.91
The Chapman test does not apply to all constitutional errors. It
does not apply to constitutional errors requiring the remedy ofbarrng • 92
barring re-prosecution. For a few select constitutional violations
of due process, reversals require a showing of likelihood of preju-
dice. 3 In those cases, the showing of likely prejudice precludes the
need to apply Chapman. "Structural defects" also do not require the
use of the Chapman test. Although there is no rule that all federal
constitutional errors require reversal,94 courts typically grant auto-
matic reversals for "defects in the constitution of the trial
mechanism, which defy analysis by 'harmless-error' standards."9 5'
86. Id. at 19 (citing Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965)).
87. Id. at 20.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 24.
91. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 15 (1999) (citation omitted) ("In Chapman v.
California, we set forth the test for determining whether a constitutional error is harmless.
That test, we said, is whether it appears 'beyond a reasonable doubt that the error com-
plained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.'").
92. Examples include violations of the guarantees of a speedy trial and protection
from double jeopardy.
93. E.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (non-disclosure by prosecutor of possi-
bly exculpatory evidence only warrants reversal when evidence would have effect on
outcome); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (requiring that defendants
claiming ineffective assistance of counsel also show that deficiency prejudiced defendant).
94. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 21.
95. Arizona v. Fulminate, 499 U.S. 279, 309 (1991). This case involved great debate
over what differentiates a trial error from a structural error. Although the justices could not
agree on how to classify involuntary confessions, which were at issue in the case, they gener-
ally agreed on a definition of structural error.
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"Structural defects" are those that affect "the framework within
which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial
process itself'. 96 Examples of structural defects include excluding
members of particular races from a grand jury and the denial of
the right of self-representation. 97
If the admission of prosecutorial use of cultural evidence is not
considered a constitutional error, a different type of review would
apply. Different jurisdictions may have their own separate rules for
appellate review so this Note will focus on the federal standard.
Since many state laws and judicial procedures are patterned after
federal rules, focusing on the federal standard of review allows for
a general study of the judicial rules across all states. For a federal
court to reverse a non-constitutional error, an appellant must
prove the loss of a substantial right affected the fairness of the trial
as a whole, by calling into question the reliability of the result.9s
The federal harmless error standard precludes prophylactic rever-
sals that dismiss the need for an outcome-impact test, which is
often referred to as a "harmless error test".9 The outcome-impact
test is often misunderstood. The standard is not whether a guilty
verdict is correct in light of all admissible evidence.0 ° The correct
understanding of the outcome-impact test is whether an appellate
court can say the fact finder's decision was not substantially swayed
by error.1° The key determinant in the outcome-impact test is the
probability of an error substantially swaying the jury. Convictions
are reversed when an appellate court determines the jury was sub-
stantially swayed by error, despite the existence of any remaining
evidence sufficient to support a conviction. However, the burden of
proof to show harmless error does not always rest on one side.' 2
The assignment of the burden of proof on a party may not matter
because after a party suggests prejudice occurred, appellate courts
look at the record and assess on their own if prejudice occurred .0
State appellate courts widely employ a harmless error test in their
96. Id. at 310.
97. Id. See also Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979) (exclusion of grand jurors on the
basis of race is automatically harmful because it undermines confidence in the judicial sys-
tem).
98. "Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not affect substantial rights
must be disregarded." FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a).
99. Bank of Nova Scotia v. U.S., 487 U.S. 250 (1988).
100. Kotteakos v. U.S., 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946) ("That conviction would, or might
probably, have resulted in properly conducted trial is not the criterion of § 269.").
101. Id.at765.
102. Id.
103. See O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432 (1995).
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own jurisdictions. 4 Therefore the impact of this test is felt far be-
yond the federal courts.
Similar to how appellate courts reserve automatic reversal for
structural defects that violate constitutional rights, courts treat
non-constitutional structural errors that infringe on substantive
rights with greater scrutiny than non-structural errors. In instances
of non-constitutional structural errors, the outcome-impact analysis
does not apply because it is difficult to pinpoint the error's effect
on the decision-making process. Additionally, such rights impli-
cated in structural errors affect values aside from the reliability of a
trial's outcome. 0 5
Prosecutorial use of cultural evidence should be considered a
structural constitutional error under Chapman or, alternatively, as a
structural non-constitutional error that avoids the outcome-impact
test. The effects of prosecutorial cultural evidence and structural
errors on the judicial process are similar. Both infect the trial proc-
ess itself by openly allowing racial prejudice to enter the jury's
decision making process. Additionally, the effects of cultural evi-
dence are pervasive throughout the entire trial process and are
difficult to isolate. When courts allow the admission of cultural evi-
dence by prosecutors, the courts endorse the evidence as sound to
the extent that it can be considered during jury deliberations. The
prejudicial impact of cultural evidence on defendants goes beyond
racially inflammatory statements uttered by prosecutors during
closing arguments. Cultural evidence is presented to the jury as
sociological fact based on observations that are supposedly free of
bias. The allowance of cultural evidence taints the trial process and
undermines the public's faith in whether individuals can receive a
fair trial. Regardless of whether prosecutorial use of cultural evi-
dence is considered a constitutional violation, appellants would
benefit from the rule that reserves automatic reversals for such
structural errors.
Alternatively, if the admission of cultural evidence by prosecu-
tors is not deemed a structural error, there are two scenarios to
consider when choosing which standard of appellate review federal
courts should apply. First, if admission of the evidence is deter-
mined only to be a constitutional error, then applying the Chapman
standard would still result in the reversal of a conviction. Courts
104. See People v. Watson, 299 P2d 243 (Cal. 1956).
105. For instance, unless structural errors are reversed, public faith in the judicial proc-
ess may diminish. The end result would be a judiciary that lacks legitimacy in the eyes of the
citizenry.
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could not say that the admission of cultural evidence did not harm
the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, so the trial court deci-
sions would fail the Chapman test. When, as in the Chu case,
cultural evidence is offered to satisfy one of the material elements
of a crime, courts cannot declare that the defendant would have
been found guilty anyway because the state has not proven one of
the elements of the crime. The other scenario of possible review
would occur when an appellate court decides that the prosecuto-
rial use of cultural evidence is a trial error but not one of
constitutional magnitude. In that case, the Kotteakos outcome-
impact standard would apply. Application of the Kotteakos standard
should also result in a reversal because use of cultural evidence to
satisfy one of the material elements, such as motive, should mean
that its use significantly affected the fact finder's decision. If a
prosecutor improperly relies on cultural evidence to demonstrate
that a defendant has fulfilled a material element, the resultant
conviction should be overturned.
PART IV-WHEN PROSECUTORIAL USE OF CULTURAL
EVIDENCE SHOULD BE ADMISSIBLE
There are a few times when cultural evidence can be useful and
pose no constitutional problems. In the ideal situation, the state
would directly link the cultural practice to the defendant by show-
ing how the defendant has personally adopted the practice. If
direct linkage is not possible, then the combination of establishing
a supportable theory as to why the defendant fits within a stereo-
type coupled with showing the supposed cultural trait to be a
central aspect of the stereotype may suffice. However, the more
prosecutors can directly link cultural evidence to defendants, the
more probative and less prejudicial the evidence becomes.
10 6
A. Directly Link Defendants to Cultural Evidence
Cultural evidence can be helpful in establishing a defendant's
identity, motive, or common plan if the prosecution can directly
connect the defendant to the belief system that underlies the
106. See supra note 7.
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cultural practice. Cultural evidence should only be admitted if the
stereotypes are demonstrated to individually apply to the
defendant. The closer the prosecution relates the belief system to
the defendant, the more probative the evidence becomes. For
instance, assume the defendant in an assault case was part of a
culture that valued the beauty of male facial hair. If a witness
testifies that the assailant was a bearded man, the prosecution
should not be allowed to introduce testimony that the defendant
would have had a beard at the time of the assault because his
culture holds facial hair in high esteem. Unless the prosecution is
able to show the defendant maintains the practices and values of
his culture, cultural evidence regarding facial hair is not probative.
Obviously then, if the prosecution can show that the man indeed
follows such practices, the evidence would be probative and could
be appropriately considered. Establishing foundational facts
regarding possible cultural beliefs such as how long the defendant
has resided in the United States and whether the defendant has
adopted other common cultural practices would assist fact finders
in determining whether the accused grew facial hair. Without an
inquiry into the defendant's cultural beliefs and practices,
presenting cultural evidence is an attempt to admit propensity
evidence.
In order to lay the foundation for the presentation of cultural
evidence by establishing the nature of a defendant's cultural beliefs
and practices, courts must develop proper guidelines. Prosecutors
must directly link a defendant to cultural evidence. Establishing
that a defendant is a member of a particular cultural group does
little more than confirm what jurors already know by observation.
Unless a defendant is from an ethnic background that differs from
what his appearance suggests, jurors can see for themselves that
the defendant is black, Asian, or Latino. In order for the probative
nature of cultural evidence to outweigh its prejudicial effect,
prosecutors must connect the defendant to the type of belief and
practice in question. For instance, in the Chu case the prosecutor
should have been required to show that Dale Chu subscribed to an
alleged aspect of Korean culture that put an extraordinary empha-
sis on family loyalty and filial piety. This showing could be met
through accepted methods of introducing character evidence such
as reputation testimony and evidence of previous acts that are in-
dicative of the specific trait at issue.
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FIGURE 1
Dale Chu
If a prosecutor can show filial piety to be one of
Chu's traits, the prosecutor can use Chu's Korean
background to explain the reason for Chu's piety. c:*
The arrow is unidirectional because it reflects how
Chu's Korean background can be used to describe
an independently established connection to filial piety, Filial Pie
but cannot be used as a basis for connecting filial
piety to him.
By directly showing how Dale Chu typically respected his father's
wishes, the prosecutor could have avoided the need for cultural
evidence altogether. Introducing evidence that revealed how Dale
Chu ordinarily listened to his parents would have been more pro-
bative than unsupported generalizations regarding a culture's high
valuation of parental obedience. If a prosecutor still wanted to use
cultural evidence, doing so would not present due process prob-
lems in this instance. Once Dale Chu's obedient nature was
established in court, the prosecutor could have used his Korean
background to explain the underlying reasons for his submissive
role as a son. Observe that this situation is different from what oc-
curred in Chu. Instead of using Chu's Korean background to
extrapolate that Chu was constricted by cultural norms to obey his
father, his ethnic background would be used to explain the origins
of one of his traits that the prosecutor has already established dur-
ing trial. Additionally, it is important to note that in this case, the
establishment of Chu's submissive trait would be done independ-
ently of racial stereotypes. The mention of Korean cultural values
would only arise once the prosecutor had established Chu's filial
piety.
Instead of trying to directly prove Dale Chu was a submissive
son, the prosecutor attempted to show jurors that Korean sons are
obedient to their parents and thus Dale Chu was as well. In Figure
2, the chart diagrams five aspects of the stereotype of a traditional
Korean son.
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The four lettered boxes represent hypothetical characteristics,
while the fifth box represents the filial piety trait that prosecutors
used in Chu. The combination of the five traits forms the stereo-
type of a traditional Korean son. In order for the prosecutor in Chu
to introduce cultural evidence in a manner inoffensive to due
process, the prosecutor would have demonstrated why Dale Chu
fits the stereotype and how filial piety is a major component of a
traditional Korean son's role.0 7 Thus, by establishing a solid link
between Dale Chu and the stereotype, and then from the stereo-
type to filial piety, the prosecutor would have minimized the
chance of racial prejudice and bias corrupting the trial. Although
this method does not directly associate Dale Chu to filial piety to
the degree that the method illustrated in Figure 1 accomplishes, it
does attempt to directly tie Chu to the prosecution's offered rea-
soning for motive.
In actuality, the state argued that Dale Chu, by virtue of having a
Korean father, fit within the stereotype of traditional Korean son,
which is represented in the figure by the diamond. Consequently,
the prosecutor argued that the trait of filial piety, one of the five
characteristics of the traditional Korean son stereotype in Figure 2,
107. Hypothetically, if a prosecutor can prove that an individual fits within a stereotype,
then cultural evidence may be permissible. However, in reality, proving that an individual fits
a stereotype may be difficult. The easiest method would be to have the defendant testify as
to his belief system and whether he does practice the cultural trait underlying the cultural
evidence. Another possible method could be to establish that the defendant was a recent
immigrant who still lived according to the societal rules of his homeland.
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applied to Dale Chu. The problem with the prosecutor's use of cul-
tural evidence was that there was no basis for connecting Dale to
the traditional Korean son stereotype except his Korean ethnicity.
As a result, the prosecutor asked jurors to make two inferences.
First, the jurors must infer that since Dale is Korean, he automati-
cally fits within the traditional Korean son stereotype. That is not to
imply that the jurors see all Koreans stereotypically. If the jurors
believed the prosecutor's claim that Dale was motivated by his cul-
tural background to commit arson and insurance fraud, in the
absence of any evidence to support why Dale Chu fit the stereotype
of a traditional Korean son, one must assume that the jurors be-
lieved that Chu fit the stereotype only on the basis of his Korean
background. Once the jurors make the first inference, they must
make the second inference that a person who fits the traditional
Korean son stereotype exhibits all the purported traits of the
stereotype. Unless the prosecutor shows that unquestionable obe-
dience to parental commands is an inherent characteristic of the
Korean son stereotype, suggesting Dale Chu fits the stereotype
does not help establish motive. Since the prosecutor in Chu did not
explore the nature of the Korean culture's emphasis on children's
respect and obedience towards parents, the jurors had to infer that
Korean culture dictated that children obey their parents. Instead
of the appropriate measures necessary reflected in Figure 2, the
prosecutor substituted established links for juror inferences, as
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The once solid lines between the rows of boxes are now dashed
to indicate that the prosecution has not established the evidentiary
foundation to link the boxes together. The dark curved line con-
necting Dale Chu to filial piety illustrates how the prosecutor used
cultural evidence to propose motive without connecting the de-
fendant to the stereotype and without connecting the stereotype to
the trait of filial piety. By merely relying on the fact that Dale Chu
is Korean, the prosecutor forced the jurors to make two levels of
propensity inferences. The first level is that he fits the traditional
Korean son stereotype. The second level is that people fitting that
stereotype endure a sense of filial obligation that can exceed the
scope of lawful conduct.
If the prosecutor can directly show Dale Chu had a heightened
sense of filial duty and family loyalty, the cultural evidence can be
directly connected to the defendant. In such a case, the prosecutor
can proceed to introduce the traditional Korean son stereotype to
explain the underlying reasons of Chu's filial piety. In other words,
the use of the stereotype would not seek to establish the existence
of an associated trait. Instead, the stereotype would be offered to
further explain the specific characteristics of a trait which prosecu-
tors have already shown the defendant to possess. Connecting Dale
Chu to the stereotype does not directly connect him to the notion
of filial piety. By merely showing that Dale Chu fits the stereotype,
the prosecutor would be forcing the jurors to make two levels of
propensity inferences. The first level is that he fits the traditional
Korean son stereotype. The second level is that people fitting that
stereotype endure a sense of filial obligation that exceeds the scope
of lawful conduct.
Judges must be cautious of prosecutorial attempts to connect a
defendant to a general stereotype. The prosecutor in the Chu case
argued that Dale Chu obeyed his father's command to commit ar-
son because Korean sons were obligated to follow their parents'
wishes. If the prosecutor had structured his argument more gener-
ally and contended that Dale Chu's responsibility to uphold an
extraordinary level of filial piety was only one of his duties as a tradi-
tional Korean son, character evidence that Dale Chu was known to
act in ways that fulfilled other aspects of a traditional Korean son
stereotype would not be sufficient to connect Dale Chu to the crime.
For instance, another aspect of the traditional Korean child stereo-
type is that children must study diligently to achieve academic
success. If the prosecutor was able to provide incontrovertible char-
acter evidence regarding Dale Chu's obsessive drive to maintain
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impressive grades, he may have linked Dale Chu to one aspect of
the traditional Korean son stereotype but that link does not con-
nect Dale Chu to filial piety. Assume Box A in Figure 2 represents
the trait of an overzealous child seeking to please his parents by
meeting their expectations of excellent grades. Now the prosecutor
is asking jurors to make the third level of inference that a Korean
student who makes a tremendous effort to academically succeed
fits the mold of a traditional Korean child. Cultural evidence is
most probative when connected directly to the trait at issue and
not the general stereotype of the defendant's alleged associated
108
group.
In the Chu case, the court allowed the prosecutor to present evi-
dence through the testimony of a Joanne Weiss, a matronly figure
who owned a house where Dale Chu lived in the summer of 1999,
to state how a Korean son such as Dale Chu could not disobey his
parents' wishes."° Such testimony does not warrant the inference
all the way to filial duty. Moreover, such statements by an individual
who has not been qualified as an expert in Korean culture should
not have been admissible. The court should have permitted the
prosecutor to only present cultural evidence that directly related to
Dale's relationship with his father. ° Any conclusory personal opin-
ions by the witness should have been considered irrelevant.
B. Cultural Evidence Based on Religious Beliefs
A particular subset of cultural evidence constitutes a narrow
exception where proof of group affiliation may be sufficient to
permit the admission of cultural evidence in criminal cases.
108. See Malley v. Connecticut, 414 F. Supp. 1115 (D. Conn. 1976) (Prosecutor's re-
marks during trial for sale and possession of LSD reflected attempt to inflame prejudices of
jury. The introduction of "drug culture" and implying, without evidentiary support, that
defendant was connected to it, violated right to a fair trial in violation of due process
clause.).
109. Wisconsin v. Chu, 643 N.W.2d 878, 883 ("I know that Dale would have to get some-
thing out of it, but his dad is the one that should be sitting in that chair. In my eyes, his dad
is the one that is responsible. Dale was a 16-year old kid and in his culture and in Dale's
beliefs, you just don't talk back to your parents, you don't-you do what your parents ask
you to do.").
110. Chu, 643 N.W.2d at 884. Part of Weiss's testimony dealt with statements Dale told
her about his relationship with his father and her personal observations of Dale's demeanor
towards this father. Such testimony is a valid presentation of cultural evidence but is cultural
evidence even necessary if the prosecutor can already prove the nature of Dale's relationship
with his father?
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Cultural evidence that relates to religion warrants special
consideration by courts. Religion can be defined as a system of
beliefs and practices."' Since all the members of a religious group
are united in a common set of beliefs, once a prosecutor exhibits




In Figure 4, the outer box represents the beliefs of Seventh Day
Adventists. The lettered individual boxes represent an official be-
lief or practice of that religion. All people who identify themselves
as Seventh Day Adventists subscribe to the set of beliefs symbolized
by the entire area within the outer rectangle. Consequently, every
Seventh Day Adventist is represented by the outer rectangle. If able
to establish that a defendant is a Seventh Day Adventist, a prosecu-
tor could introduce relevant evidence regarding any of the official
religious values or routines of the Seventh Day Adventist Church
without giving rise to most of the problems inherently associated
with cultural evidence.
Religions that are an aspect of one's ethnic culture pose a
unique problem. 2 For instance, all Jews are born with a Jewish
ethnic background, but all Jews may not be practicing members of
their faith. When ethnicity and religious beliefs converge, courts
must be cautious in deciding whether proposed testimony directly
relates to the defendant.'" If the religion in question implicates
111. OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY, 764 (1980): (defining religion as "1. belief in the
existence of a superhuman controlling power, especially of God or gods, usually expressed
in worship. 2. a particular system of faith and worship, the Christian religion. 3. something
compared to religious faith as a controlling influence on a person's life.").
112. See Bains v. Cambra, 204 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2000) (allowing the introduction of re-
ligious beliefs in murder trial of unfaithful Sikh husband to establish possible motive but
holding prosecutor's summation as exceeding scope of allowable cultural evidence).
113. Id. at 974:
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ethnicity, the extent of a defendant's religious belief must be estab-
lished if the prosecutor wants to propose a religious motive for a
crime. Otherwise, if a prosecutor is staking a claim based on cul-
tural practices as dictated by ethnic customs, the same procedure
for admitting other types of cultural evidence should apply. The
critical factor in whether cultural evidence should be allowed is the
degree to which it can be directly linked to the defendant. Group
membership is not enough. There must be independent criteria
that indicate the defendant fits within the stereotype the prosecu-
tor is offering for non-propensity purposes.
PART V-CONCLUSION
Cultural evidence must be held to a higher standard of review
than the current standards require. Controlling its use in court-
rooms is an easy task and can be done with little cost. Improper use
of cultural evidence should be considered a structural error requir-
ing automatic reversal on appeal. The use of cultural evidence
differs from prosecutorial misconduct and improper arguments by
prosecutors because it allows jurors to exercise biases openly on
the justification of reasoned analysis of trial evidence. Although
some use of cultural evidence is allowable in narrow circumstances,
its use can be avoided altogether by a direct showing that a defen-
dant possessed the particular type of belief or habit. The Fifth
Amendment guarantees citizens the right to due process of law.
Unrestrained use of cultural evidence threatens that right and
must be limited whenever possible to ensure equal access to justice.
The Fifth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the
due process of law in federal proceedings, while the Fourteenth
Amendment protects their right to due process in state
It is not inconceivable that the prosecutor's discriminatory remarks against Sikh per-
sons actually were a form of religious rather than racial or ethnic discrimination.
After all, the technical definition of Sikhism is that it is an offshoot of the Hindu re-
ligion. Given the correlation between being a Sikh and being racially and ethnically
Indian and the prosecutor's comparison of being an American and being a Sikh, the
classification also seems to have racial and ethnic components. Moreover, although
perhaps to a lesser extent, religion-based prosecutorial arguments also are prohibited
under clearly established federal law.
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proceedings. ' 4 One of the pillars of the American justice system is
the right to a fair trial free from racial prejudice. Courts review
improper prosecutorial statements under a harmless error
standard."15 The exact standards of review vary between jurisdictions
but all are based on a showing of prejudice. While cultural evidence
should generally not be admitted, if it is admitted and considered,
courts should hold such evidence to a stricter standard than
harmless error because it is more difficult to estimate its effect on
jurors.
114. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3 (1964) (holding that the "Fourteenth Amendment
guaranteed the petitioner the protection of the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-
incrimination").
115. See Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (although prosecutor's com-
ments were improper, it does not matter unless the comments infected trial with such
unfairness to result in a denial of due process.)
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